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The Role of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines in the Wake
of United States v. Booker and
United States v. Fanfan

by Rosemary T. Cakmis*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The year 2004 began much like previous years, at least when it came
to decisions from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals interpreting the
United States Sentencing Guidelines CU.S.S.G." or "federal sentencing
guidelines" or "guidelines"). In less than one year, however, the federal
sentencing guidelines and related Eleventh Circuit decisions took on a
fascinating new dimension in light of 2004-2005 United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence. This jurisprudence culminated with the January
12, 2005 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker,' which was
consolidated with United States v. Fanfan2 ("Booker /Fanfan"). Therein,

the Supreme Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's position over the last
few years, and the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial, as construed in Apprendi v. New Jersey,3 and Blakely v.
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Delegate, Orlando Chapter of the Federal Bar Association; Member, Ninth Circuit
Grievance Committee for The Florida Bar.
A special thanks is owed to R. Fletcher Peacock, Federal Public Defender for the Middle
District of Florida, Stephen Langs, Assistant Federal Public Defender, and Margaret
Bundy, Paralegal Specialist with the Office of the Federal Public Defender, without whom
this Article could not have been completed.
1. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
2. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
3. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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Washington,4 applies to the federal sentencing guidelines. 5 According
to the Supreme Court, the remedy is to sever and excise the portion of
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("the Act") 6 that makes the guidelines mandatory, thereby making them merely advisory.
Thus, as of January 12, 2005, the federal sentencing guidelines have
become merely one of many factors to be consulted by the federal courts
in determining an appropriate sentence to impose instead of having it
be the defining factor in sentencing criminal defendants. The significance of the decisions reflecting this revolutionary role of the federal
sentencing guidelines makes the 2004 circuit court decisions reviewing
the application of the federal sentencing guidelines pale in comparison.
Therefore, unlike in previous years, this Article will not review all of the
Eleventh Circuit cases from last year that addressed the federal
sentencing guidelines.' Rather, this Article will address the recent
Supreme Court cases that have redefined the role of the federal
sentencing guidelines in sentencing federal criminal defendants, the
context in which those Supreme Court cases arose, and the 2004-2005
Eleventh Circuit cases that have applied the teachings of those Supreme
Court cases.
II.

BACKGROUND: THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES BEFORE BOOKER/FANFAN
jumping into the post-Booker/Fanfan9 role of the federal

Before
sentencing guidelines, a brief historical review of the guidelines and the

4. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
5. Booker/Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. at 750-56.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1984).
7. Booker/Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. at 756-69.
8. Since 1999 the Author of this Article has annually authored or co-authored articles
for Mercer Law Review on the Eleventh Circuit cases interpreting the federal sentencing
guidelines. Each year, all of the Eleventh Circuit cases addressing the guidelines from the
previous year have been digested and discussed.
In 2000 the Supreme Court decided Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (holding "[oither than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt"). Since then, these annual articles have noted the Eleventh Circuit cases
that have held to the position that Apprendi does not apply to the sentencing guidelines.
See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding
Apprendi does not apply to the federal sentencing guidelines), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 942
(2002). As discussed infra, that era is now over. See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 382 F.3d
1308 (1lth Cir. 2004) (holding Blakely does not apply to the federal sentencing guidelines),
vacated and remanded to No. 04-7570, 2005 WL 126622 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2005), vacated by
397 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005).
9. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
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cases that gave rise to Booker/Fanfan is needed to better understand
how and why the Supreme Court redefined the role of the federal
sentencing guidelines in Booker/Fanfan and put that role in context.
For almost a century, until the federal sentencing guidelines went into
effect in 1986,1° federal judges wielded broad discretion under an
indeterminate sentencing system, whereby federal judges could impose
any sentence upon criminal defendants from probation up to and
including the statutory maximum as set forth in the United States
Code." Sentences within the maximum allowable under the statute of
conviction were generally met with "virtually unconditional deference on
no supervised release; instead,
appeal."12 Additionally, there was
13
defendants were subject to parole.
The enactment of the federal sentencing guidelines drastically changed
the manner in which federal criminal defendants were sentenced. The
discretion of federal judges was sharply curtailed because they were
required to impose a sentence mandated by the federal sentencing
guidelines, which were mandatory and binding. 4 Parole was abolished,
and supervised release was established as a transitional period between
prison and freedom. 5 The government as well as defendants were
given rights to appeal sentences that were imposed in violation of the
federal sentencing guidelines. 6
Not long after the federal sentencing guidelines went into effect, the
Supreme Court upheld their constitutionality in Mistretta v. United
States.'7 In so ruling, the Court rejected claims that Congress delegated excessive legislative power to the United States Sentencing Commission ("the Commission"), thus, violating the separation-of-powers
principle, by placing the Commission in the Judicial Branch, requiring
federal judges to serve on the Commission and share their authority

10. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3626 (1984).
11. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
Statutes specified the penalties for crimes but nearly always gave the sentencing
judge wide discretion to decide whether the offender should be incarcerated and
for how long, whether he should be fined and how much, and whether some lesser
restraint, such as probation, should be imposed instead of imprisonment or fine.
Id.
12. Id. at 364.
13. Id. at 364-65. "Thus, under the indeterminate-sentence system, Congress defined
the maximum, the judge imposed a sentence within the statutory range (which he usually
could replace with probation), and the Executive Branch's parole official eventually
determined the actual duration of imprisonment." Id.
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
15. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994, 995(a)(1) (1993 & Supp. 2004).
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
17. 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
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with non-judges, and empowering the President to appoint Commission
members and remove them for cause. 8 Justice Scalia dissented
because he could "find no place within our constitutional system for an
agency created by Congress to exercise no governmental power other
than the making of laws," and because he believed the guidelines have
"the force and effect of laws, prescribing the sentences criminal
defendants are to receive."19
Later, in Stinson v. United States, 20 the Supreme Court reaffirmed
that the guidelines had the force of law.2" The Court further held that
the commentary in the U.S.S.G. manual is also binding and authoritative.22
III.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES FROM MANDATORY TO ADVISORY

Although most federal criminal practitioners recognize Blakely v.
Washington2 3 as the beginning of the evolution of the federal sentencing guidelines, the actual beginnings can be seen in Jones v. United
States.24 In that case, the Supreme Court interpreted the federal
carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119,25 which provides three different
maximum penalties depending on proof of various facts.
Specifically,
if it is proved that the defendant committed the basic crime (namely,
that the defendant took a motor vehicle that was moved in interstate or
foreign commerce from someone by force, violence, or intimidation, with
intent to cause death or serious bodily harm), the maximum penalty is
fifteen years in prison. If serious bodily injury results, the maximum
term of imprisonment increases to twenty-five years.28 If death results,
any number of years, up to life imprisonment or death, may be
imposed.2" The Supreme Court in Jones held that § 2119 defined three
distinct offenses, as opposed to a single crime with three maximum

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 390.
Id. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
508 U.S. 36 (1993).
Id. at 38.
Id. at 46.
124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
526 U.S. 227 (1999).
18 U.S.C. § 2119(1) (2000).
Jones, 526 U.S. at 227.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1).
See id. § 2119(2).
See id. § 2119(3).
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factors exempt from the
penalties, two of which depended on sentencing
30
verdict.
jury
and
charge
of
requirements
Although the Supreme Court resolved Jones based on statutory
interpretation, the Court further justified its decision by invoking the
doctrine of constitutional doubt."1 The Court stated that if serious
bodily injury, which increased the statutory maximum under the car
jacking statute, was construed as a sentencing factor, the statute would
be open to constitutional doubt.3 2 The Supreme Court then made the
oft-quoted statement in footnote six-which is the basis for the holding
in Apprendi v. New Jersey3 3-that:

[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice
and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than
prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond
be charged in an indictment,
34
a reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court explained that "[biecause our prior cases suggest
rather than establish this principle, our concern .

..

rises only to the

level of doubt, not certainty." 5
The next year, however, on June 28, 2000, the Supreme Court took the
next step and dealt with the constitutional issue touched upon in
footnote six of Jones when the Court decided Apprendi. 6 Two of the
three counts defendant pleaded guilty to in Apprendi, a state case out of
New Jersey, were second-degree offenses for possession of a firearm for
an unlawful purpose. The statutory penalty for that second degree crime
was five to ten years of imprisonment. A separate state statute (a New
Jersey hate crime statute), which was not referred to in the indictment
in this case, provided for higher minimum and maximum penalties if the
sentencing court made factual findings. After defendant pleaded guilty
to the second degree crime, the state court held an evidentiary hearing
and found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the facts necessary
30. Jones, 526 U.S. at 251-52.
31. Id. at 240-51.
32. Id. at 243-44.
33. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
34. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6.
35. Id. See also id. at 251-52 (footnote omitted).
Any doubt on the issue of statutory construction is hence to be resolved in favor
of avoiding those questions. This is done by construing § 2119 as establishing
three separate offenses by the specification of distinct elements, each of which
must be charged by indictment, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted
to a jury for its verdict.
Id.
36. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466.
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for imposition of the higher penalties existed.
Over defendant's
constitutional objection, the state court then sentenced defendant to
twelve years of imprisonment.37 On appeal defendant argued, "inter
alia, that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
requires that the finding of bias upon which his hate crime sentence was
based must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."3' The state
appellate court affirmed, concluding that the hate crime enhancement
was a sentencing factor, not an essential element.39
The United States Supreme Court framed the issue in Apprendi as:
"whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum
prison sentence for an offense from ten to twenty years be made by a
jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."40 Stating that
the answer to this question was foreshadowed by Jones, the Supreme
Court held:
Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribedstatutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.. .. "[Lilt
is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the
assessment of facts [other than prior convictions] that increase the
prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.
It is equally clear that
such facts must be established by proof beyond
41
a reasonable doubt."
Although the Apprendi majority specifically noted (as the majority did
in Blakely) that the federal sentencing guidelines were not before the
Court, Justice O'Connor, in her dissent in Apprendi," stated that the
principle announced by the majority "thus would apply ... to all
determinate-sentencing schemes in which the length of a defendant's
sentence within the statutory range turns on specific factual determinations (e.g., the federal Sentencing Guidelines)."4 3 Justice O'Connor's
dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Breyer,
and Justice Kennedy, went on to chastise the Apprendi majority for
failing "to clarify the precise contours of the constitutional principle

37. Id. at 469-71.
38. Id. at 471.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 469.
41. Id. at 490 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252-53) (Stevens, J., concurring).
42. The four justices who dissented in Apprendi were the same four who dissented in
Blakely v. Washington-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer, O'Connor, and
Kennedy. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468; Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2534.
43. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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underlying its decision," which, according to the dissent, left "federal and
state judges ... in a state of limbo." 44 In breaking from the "traditionally ... cautious approach" of Supreme Court precedent, the dissent
claimed: "The Court throws that caution to the wind and, in the process,
will likely
threatens to cast sentencing in the United States into what
45
prove to be a lengthy period of considerable confusion."
That "lengthy period of considerable confusion"46 lasted about four
and one-half years.47 Although in 2001 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, vacated lower courts' decisions, and remanded numerous cases
for further consideration in light of Apprendi,4 s the Court rendered no
opinions explicitly applying, interpreting, or clarifying Apprendi in 2001.
After almost two years of silence following its June 28, 2000 decision
in Apprendi, the Supreme Court rendered three decisions in rapid
succession, applying Apprendi in three different contexts. Those cases
did little, if anything, to end the confusion concerning whether Apprendi
applied to the federal sentencing guidelines.
On May 20, 2002, in United States v. Cotton,49 the Court reviewed a
sentence that was imposed under a federal drug statute, 21 U.S.C.
§ 841,50 which provides graduated penalties depending on the type and
quantity of drugs involved. 5' Applying the plain error standard of
review because defendant failed to raise the issue in the trial court, the
Supreme Court held that the statutory sentence based on a drug
quantity, which was not alleged in the indictment, was error under
Apprendi but was not a "jurisdictional" error.5 2 The Court then skipped

44. Id. at 551 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 552 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
46. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
47. Arguably, there will always be some confusion. Despite the fact the Court in
Booker/Fanfan held in no uncertain terms that the Sixth Amendment, as construed in
Apprendi and Blakely, does apply to the federal sentencing guidelines, the circuits are now
split on how to apply the plain error test in cases when the issue was not preserved in the
district courts. See discussion infra.
48. See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 532 U.S. 968 (2001); Ravelo v. United States, 532
U.S. 955 (2001); Bayona v. United States, 531 U.S. 1135 (2001); Tapia v. United States, 531
U.S. 1136 (2001); Dore v. United States, 531 U.S. 1109 (2001); Griffiths v. United States,
531 U.S. 1109 (2001); Phillips v. United States, 531 U.S. 1109 (2001); Cloud v. United
States, 531 U.S. 1062 (2001); Hayes v. United States, 531 U.S. 1062 (2001); Ardley v.
United States, 531 U.S. 1063 (2001); Garcia v. United States, 531 U.S. 1062 (2001); Potts
v. United States, 531 U.S. 1006 (2000); Curry v. United States, 531 U.S. 953 (2000); Hester
v. United States, 531 U.S. 941 (2000); Brown v. United States, 531 U.S. 920 (2000); Wims
v. United States, 531 U.S. 801 (2000).
49. 535 U.S. 625 (2002).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000).
51. Id.; Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631.
52. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631-32.
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the third prong of plain error inquiry, whether the error affected
defendant's substantial rights, because it concluded that the error failed
the fourth prong of the inquiry-it did not seriously affect the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.53 Although
§ 841 can be analogized to the federal sentencing guidelines because
both provide for increased penalties based on the type and quantity of
drugs involved, the Court in Cotton did not mention the federal
sentencing guidelines.
The decisions in the two other cases were both rendered on June 24,
2002, shortly before the Supreme Court ended its October 2001 term.
Ring v.Arizona14 applied Apprendi in a special category of sentencing
cases-state death penalty sentencings.5 5 There, the Supreme Court
overruled Walton v. Arizona,5" and held that the Sixth Amendment
requires a jury determination of aggravating factors.5 7 The Court did
not address the federal sentencing guidelines in Ring.
In Harris v. United States,5" the Court addressed Apprendi in the
context of another special category of statutory sentencing-mandatory
minimum sentences.59 Relying on the rules of statutory construction,
the Court in Harrisheld that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A),60 which provides
a seven-year mandatory minimum sentence for a person convicted of
"brandishing" a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, establish-

53. Id. at 632-34. The Court stated that the evidence that the federal drug conspiracy
involved at least 50 grams of cocaine was "overwhelming" and "essentially uncontroverted."
Id. at 633. The Court concluded that
[t]he real threat then to the "fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial
proceedings" would be if respondents, despite the overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that they were involved in a vast drug conspiracy, were to receive a
sentence prescribed for those committing less substantial drug offenses because
of an error that was never objected to at trial.
Id. at 634.
54. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
55. Id. at 586.
56. 497 U.S. 639, 639 (1990) (holding that aggravating factors need not be found by a
jury in a capital case).
57. Ring, 536 U.S. at 589. In Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004), decided the
same day as Blakely and, like Blakely, written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court ruled
that Ring was properly classified as procedural, rather than substantive, and that Ring did
not announce a watershed rule of criminal procedure. Id. at 2523. Thus, in Schriro,the
Supreme Court held that Ring does not apply retroactively to death penalty cases already
final on direct review. Id.
58. 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
59. Id. at 547.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000).
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es a sentencing factor that may be found by a judge without violating
the rule of Apprendi.6 '
Although Harris was a statutory construction case, not a guideline
case, the Court did mention the federal sentencing guidelines, noting
that it "seems likely that brandishing and discharging were meant to
serve the same function under the statute as they do under the
Guidelines."62 Also, in his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer condemned mandatory minimum sentences, while extolling guideline
sentences.63 The dissent, which would form the majority in Blakely
when joined by Justice Scalia, mentioned the guidelines as well, but only
to note how the mandatory minimum sentence under § 924(C) 64 affects
the guideline sentence. 5
After these three Supreme Court decisions applying Apprendi were
rendered in May and June of 2002, the Court retreated into silence until
June 24, 2004, when the Court rendered its decision in Blakely. During
this time, however, the federal circuit and district courts were not silent
nor were federal criminal defense practitioners. As early as 1999 and
2000, following the decisions in Jones and Apprendi, federal criminal
defense practitioners attempted to apply those cases in the context of
facts that had been treated as sentencing factors, such as drug quantity,
which raised the statutory maximum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) and the

61. Id.; Harris,536 U.S. at 568. In so ruling, the Court declined to overrule McMillan
v.Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). Harris,536 U.S. at 568. Notwithstanding, it should
be noted that the federal firearm statute at issue in Harris,like the Pennsylvania statute
involved in McMillan, had factors that raised the minimum sentence, but did not increase
the maximum sentence. The federal drug statutes, like 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000), are
distinguishable because they contain factors, like drug quantity, that not only raise the
statutory minimum, but also raise the maximum sentence.
62. Harris,536 U.S. at 554. This portion of the opinion of the Court was delivered by
Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia,
and Justice Breyer. Id. at 548.
63. See, e.g., id. at 570 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Mandatory minimum statutes are fundamentally inconsistent with Congress'
simultaneous effort to create a fair, honest, and rational sentencing system
through the use of Sentencing Guidelines. Unlike Guideline sentences, statutory
mandatory minimums generally deny the judge the legal power to depart
downward, no matter how unusual the special circumstances that call for leniency.
Id. at 571 (Breyer, J., concurring). "[Mandatory minimum sentences] transfer sentencing
power to prosecutors, who can determine sentences through the charges they decide to
bring, and who thereby have reintroduced much of the sentencing disparity that Congress
created Guidelines to eliminate." Id. Needless to say, Justice Breyer dissented in
Apprendi and Blakely, and did not join in the constitutional holding in Booker/Fanfan.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000).
65. Harris,536 U.S. at 578 n.4 (Thomas, Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
The dissent would have reaffirmed Apprendi and overruled McMillan. Id. at 573.
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guideline range under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.")
The Eleventh Circuit was quick to rebuff such
section 2D1. 1.66
arguments.67
In 2001 the Eleventh Circuit issued an en banc decision definitively
stating its position on Apprendi. United States v. Sanchez,65 which
includes concurrences by Judge Tjoflat, Judge Barkett, and Judge
Wilson, is a must-read to understand the Eleventh Circuit's position on
Apprendi and its progeny. In essence, the en banc majority holding
strictly limited the applicability of Apprendi 9 The court held that
Apprendi has no application to, or effect on, federal sentencing guidelines calculations when the ultimate sentence imposed does not exceed
the prescribed statutory maximum penalty as set forth in the United
States Code.7 °
The Eleventh Circuit's position that Apprendi did not apply to the
federal sentencing guidelines was shared by every federal circuit in the
country,7 1 at least until the Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Blakely. Before Blakely, as noted by Justice O'Connor in her dissenting
opinion in Blakely, the only court to have "ever applied Apprendi to
invalidate application of a guidelines scheme" was a state court in

66. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2003).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Hester, 199 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that drug
quantity was a sentencing factor, not an element, of offenses charged under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hester, vacated the decision below, and
remanded for further consideration in light ofApprendi. Hester v. United States, 531 U.S.
941 (2000). On remand, the Eleventh Circuit initially vacated its prior decision and
remanded for resentencing. United States v. Hester, No. 97-9232 2001, 2001 WL 896897
(11th Cir. Aug. 9, 2001). However, on its own motion, the Eleventh Circuit then vacated
its initial decision on remand and held the case in abeyance for further consideration.
United States v. Hester, 262 F.3d 1258, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001). Following the en banc
decision in United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2001), the Eleventh Circuit
reinstated its original decision in Hester. United States v. Hester, 287 F.3d 1355, 1357
(11th Cir. 2002).
68. 269 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
69. Id. at 1269.
70. Id. at 1262-63.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Goodine, 326 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v.
Helton, 349 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Johnson, 335 F.3d 589 (7th Cir.
2003); United States v. Piggie, 316 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Toliver, 351
F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Luciano, 311 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2002); United
States v. Randle, 304 F.3d 373 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Mendez-Zamora, 296 F.3d
1013 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2001); United
States v. Fields, 251 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192 (4th
Cir. 2000).
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Kansas.7 2 Hence, according to Justice O'Connor, "there is no map of
the uncharted territory blazed by [Blakely's] unprecedented holding."73
IV.

BLAKELY V. WASHINGTON

On June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court ended its four year silence on
whether the rule announced in Apprendi v.New Jersey7 4 applies in the
context of sentencing guidelines. Although the Court held that Apprendi
was applicable in such a context because Blakely v. Washington75
involved state guidelines rather than the federal sentencing guidelines,
the "lengthy period of considerable confusion"" warned of by the
dissent in Apprendi was not ended by the decision in Blakely."
However, the reasoning of Blakely laid the way for Booker/Fanfan.75
In Blakely defendant pleaded guilty to second degree kidnapping
involving domestic violence and use of a firearm, a Class B felony, and
admitted to the elements of the charge but to no other relevant facts.79
The maximum sentence under the Washington statutes for a Class B
felony was ten years, although other statutes further limited the range
of sentences that could be imposed. The standard range of imprisonment
specified by Washington's Sentencing Reform Act ("Washington Act") in
Blakely was forty-nine to fifty-three months."0 A sentence above this
range could only be imposed if the judge found "substantial and
compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence." 8' The Washington Act set forth a non-exclusive list of aggravating factors and provided
that a reason offered to justify an exceptional sentence could be

72. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2547 n.1 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Gould, 23
P.3d 801 (2001)) (comparative citations omitted).
73. Id. at 2547 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
74. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
75. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
76. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 552 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537-38.
78. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
79. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2534-35. In 1998 Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr., kidnaped his
estranged wife, bound her with duct tape, forced her into a box in the bed of his pickup
truck at knife point, and implored her to dismiss the divorce and related trust proceedings.
He then threatened to harm her with a shotgun if their thirteen-year-old son did not follow
him in another car. The son escaped en route to a friend's house in Montana. Mr. Blakely
was thereafter arrested and charged with first degree kidnaping under Washington state
law. Id. at 2534.
80. Id. at 2535.
81. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.120(2) (2000) (recodified as § 9.94A.505
(2001)).
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considered only if it took into account factors other than those used in
computing the standard range sentence.8 2
While the state recommended a sentence within the standard range,
the judge, after hearing testimony and making thirty-two findings of
fact, imposed an exceptional sentence of ninety months. This increase
of thirty-seven months beyond the standard range was grounded on the
determination that defendant acted with "deliberate cruelty," a
statutorily enumerated ground for departure in domestic violence cases.
Defendant did not admit to, and no jury found, the facts underlying this
enhancement. Defendant preserved his challenge to the enhancement
by arguing that this sentencing procedure deprived him of his federal
constitutional right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt,
all facts legally essential to his sentence. After the state appellate court
affirmed the sentence and the state supreme court denied discretionary
review, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.8 3
The Supreme Court addressed the State of Washington's sentencing
guideline scheme in light of the rule espoused in Apprendi, that is,
"'[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."' 84 The
Supreme Court transcended the traditional meaning of the term
"statutory maximum," such that it encompassed the sentencing
guidelines.85 Specifically, the Court explained that "the 'statutory
maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis 8of
6 the facts reflected in the jury verdict or
admitted by the defendant."
The Supreme Court in Blakely explained that the rule set forth in
Apprendi
reflects two longstanding tenets of common-law criminal jurisprudence:
that the "truth of every accusation" against a defendant "should
afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his
equals and neighbours . . ." and that "an accusation which lacks any

particular fact which the law makes essential to the punishment is...
no accusation within the requirements of the common law, and it is no
accusation in reason."87

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2536.
(quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).
at 2537.
at 2536 (citations omitted).
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The Court in Blakely rejected the commonly held belief that the
"prescribed statutory maximum" referenced in Apprendi was the
maximum term of years the court could impose under the statute setting
forth the crime or class of crimes. 8 Instead, the Court noted that in
both Apprendi and Ring v.Arizona, 9 the Court held that defendants'
constitutional rights had been violated because the judge imposed a
under state
sentence "greater than the maximum he could
90 have imposed
law without the challenged factual finding."
The Supreme Court rejected the state's two attempts to save the
92
the
guidelines scheme. 91 It distinguished McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
mandatory minimum case that the plurality in Harris v. United
States93 declined to overrule, and Williams v. New York, 94 which
involved an indeterminate-sentencing regime that allowed, but did not
compel, a judge to rely on facts outside the trial record in determining
whether to impose a death sentence.9 5 The Supreme Court explained
that neither case involved a sentence greater than what state law
authorized on the basis of the verdict alone.9" The Court also found
immaterial the distinction that in Apprendi and Ring, the statutory
grounds for departure were exclusive; while under the State of WashingThe Court
ton's sentencing scheme, the grounds were illustrative.
reasoned that in each of98 those systems, the jury's verdict alone did not
authorize the sentence.
Like Apprendi, Blakely was highly controversial and was decided
within days of the end of the Supreme Court's term. Very shortly after
issuing these landmark decisions, the Supreme Court left the bench with
many questions remaining unanswered-perhaps the most significant of
which was whether the reasoning of those cases applied to the federal

88. Id. at 2538.
89. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
90. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
91. Id. at 2538.
92. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
93. 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
94. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
95. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2538.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. The majority also criticized the dissenters' standard for distinguishing between
elements of the crime and sentencing enhancements-what Justice Scalia called "the
constitutional principle that the tail shall not wag the dog"-as wholly subjective. Id. at
2539, 2542 n.13.
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sentencing guidelines.99 However, before ending its term, and within
days of deciding both cases, the Supreme Court selected another case in
which it issued a memorandum opinion granting certiorari, vacating the
decision below, and remanding for further consideration. Following
Apprendi, the Court selected a federal drug case from the Tenth Circuit
to remand for further consideration. 100 Within days of deciding
Blakely, the Supreme Court remanded a decision by the Oregon Supreme
Court that had held the Oregon state sentencing guidelines were
constitutional. 10' At this point, the aftermath of Apprendi and Blakely
began to diverge.
Unlike the October term following Apprendi, the Supreme Court did
not return to the bench in October of 2004 and immediately begin
issuing memorandum opinions in numerous cases, remanding them for
further consideration in light of Blakely. The Court also did not take
years to call for further argument on the ramifications of Blakely as it
did after Apprendi. Instead, as discussed below, the Court took a clearer
and more expeditious route, perhaps due at least in part, to the
significant impact Blakely had on federal courts nationwide.

99. Although the Supreme Court's opinion in Blakely does not specifically address the
burdens of proof and appropriate fact finder for guideline range decisions under the federal
sentencing guidelines, the opinion does explain that when any significant increase in a
defendant's maximum sentencing exposure is affected by a binding sentencing guideline
calculation, trial by jury, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt are required. See id. at
2542.
Any evaluation of Apprendi's "fairness" to criminal defendants must compare it
with the regime it replaced, in which a defendant, with no warning in either his
indictment or plea, would routinely see his maximum potential sentence balloon
from as little as five years to as much as life imprisonment ....
based not on facts
proved to his peers beyond a reasonable doubt, but on facts extracted after trial
from a report compiled by a probation officer who the judge thinks more likely got
it right than got it wrong.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted). See also id. at 2549 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting
that because enhancements found in Chapters Two and Three of the federal sentencing
guidelines are controlled by the reasoning of Blakely, "[elvery sentence imposed under such
guidelines in cases currently pending on direct appeal is in jeopardy").
In his dissenting opinion in Blakely, Justice Breyer voiced his concern about the need for
certainty in the realm of federal sentencings, and indicated that the Court should have
called for further argument, rather than dealing with the Apprendi-related issues in a
"piecemeal" fashion. Id. at 2561-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Fortunately, although the
Supreme Court did proceed in a somewhat piecemeal fashion, it did so on an expedited
basis so as not to bring about many of the fears noted by Justice Breyer.
100. Jones v. United States, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000).
101. See State v. Dilts, 82 P.3d 593 (Or. 2003) (holding that imposition of an upward
departure sentence did not violate defendant's federal constitutional rights to fair trial or
due process), vacated by Dilts v. Oregon, 124 S. Ct. 2906 (2004) (mem.).
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BETWEEN BLAKELY (6/24/04) AND BOOKER/FANFAN (1/12/05)

Although Blakely v. Washington °2 addressed the Washington state
sentencing guidelines, its language and reasoning prompted federal
courts across the country to re-examine the applicability of Apprendi v.
New Jersey... to the federal sentencing guidelines. Some circuits
overruled their precedent and held Apprendi and Blakely did apply to
the federal sentencing guidelines;" 4 while other circuits, including the
Eleventh Circuit,'0 5 continued to reject the application of Apprendi to
the federal guidelines.' °6 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals took a
unique approach. Rather than resolving the matter itself, on July 12,
2004, the Second Circuit certified three questions, each concerning
whether or how the Sixth Amendment applied to the federal sentencing
guidelines, to be heard by the Supreme Court "at its earliest convenience, with an expedited briefing and hearing schedule.. . in order to
minimize, to the extent possible, what we see as an impending crisis in
the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts." 0 7 Instead

102. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
103. 530 U.s. 466 (2000).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the
federal sentencing guidelines were unconstitutional in light of Blakely, but there was no
constitutional violation in applying the guidelines when no fact-based enhancement
occurred), affd and remanded to 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005); United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d
967 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding Blakely applicable to the federal sentencing guidelines,
although said guidelines, as a whole, were not unconstitutional).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 382 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding Blakely
did not apply to the federal sentencing guidelines), vacated and remanded to No. 04-7570,
2005 WL 126622 (U.S. Jan. 24, 2005), vacated by 397 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Mincey, 380 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that absent
a Supreme Court ruling to the contrary, the Sixth Amendment did not require that every
enhancement factor under the U.S.S.G. be pleaded and proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt); United States v. Hammoud, 378 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2004) (ruling en
banc, that district courts should continue sentencing defendants in accordance with the
federal guidelines, but, pending a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court, should also
announce, at the time of sentencing, a sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), treating
the guidelines as advisory only); United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2004)
(holding that Blakely did not apply to federal sentencing guidelines); United States v. Koch,
383 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004) (ruling that the U.S.S.G. did not violate the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial).
107. United States v. Penaranda, 375 F.3d 238, 248 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
The questions certified by the Second Circuit were:
1. Does the Sixth Amendment permit a federal district judge to find facts, not
reflected in a jury's verdict or admitted by a defendant, that form the basis for
determining the applicable adjusted offense level under the federal Sentencing
Guidelines and any upward departure from that offense level?
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of answering the Second Circuit's questions directly, the Supreme Court
allowed these questions to remain pending until shortly after Book0°
erlFanfan
' was decided. Then, on January 24, 2005, the Supreme
Court summarily dismissed the action." 9
On July 21, 2004, just nine days after the Second Circuit certified its
questions to the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General petitioned the
Supreme Court for writs of certiorari in United States v. Booker"0 and
United States v. Fanfan, 'm which were later consolidated. 1 1 2 That
same day, the Solicitor General's motions for expedited briefing were
filed and granted in both cases." 3 Then, on August 2, 2004, the
Supreme Court granted the Solicitor General's certiorari petitions and
scheduled oral arguments for October 4, 2004.114
The questions posed to the Supreme Court were:
1. Whether the Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of an
enhanced sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
based on the sentencing judge's determination of a fact (other than a
prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the
defendant.

2. In a case where a jury has convicted a defendant of possessing with intent to
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and one kilogram or more of heroin,
does the Sixth Amendment permit a federal district judge to determine, under the
federal Sentencing Guidelines, the quantity of drugs for which the defendant is
responsible and upon which his base offense level and corresponding sentencing
range will be calculated, under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.l?
3. In a case where a defendant has pled guilty to conspiring to distribute five
kilograms or more of cocaine, does the Sixth Amendment permit a federal district
judge to determine, under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, (a) the quantity of
drugs for which the defendant is responsible and upon which his base offense level
and corresponding sentencing range will be calculated, under U.S.S.G. § 2D1. 1; (b)
the applicability of a two-level enhancement to the base offense level for carrying
a gun in connection with the offense, under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1); and (c) the
applicability of a three-level managerial role enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 3B.1(b)?
Id. at 247.
108. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
109. United States v. Penaranda, 125 S. Ct. 984 (2005).
110. 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 4056 (U.S. Jan.
12, 2005) (No. 04-104).
111. 125 S. Ct. 12 (2004), petition for cert. filed, 3 U.S.L.W. 3073 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2004)
(No. 04-105).
112. Booker/Fanfan v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
113. Id.
114. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 11 (2004); United States v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct.
12 (2004).
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2. If the answer to the first question is "yes," the following question is
presented: whether, in a case in which the Guidelines would require
the court to find a sentence-enhancing fact, the Guidelines as a whole
would be inapplicable, as a matter of severability analysis, such that
the sentencing court must exercise its discretion to sentence the
defendant within the1 5maximum and minimum set by statute for the
offense of conviction.
On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court answered those questions,
thereby settling the split among the circuits in the most momentous
federal sentencing guidelines decision since the enactment of the
guidelines almost two decades ago."'
VI.

UNITED STATES v. BOOKER & UNITED STATES V. FANFAN

The same Justices (Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia, Justice Souter,
Justice Thomas, and Justice Ginsburg) formed the majority in Apprendi
v. New Jersey11 ' and in Blakely v. Washington,"' the only difference
being that Justice Stevens authored Apprendi and Justice Scalia
authored Blakely."9 Likewise, the same Justices dissented in both
Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Breyer, and
cases (Chief Justice
120
Justice Kennedy).
Booker/Fanfan121 contains two majority opinions-the first dealing
with the constitutionality of the federal sentencing guidelines in light of
23
Apprendi and Blakely, 12 and the second dealing with the remedy.
The same Justices who formed the majority in Apprendi and Blakely
joined in the first majority opinion in Booker/Fanfan, with Justice
24
Stevens delivering the opinion in Apprendi and Booker/Fanfan.'
Justice Ginsberg then parted ways with those Justices and joined with
the Justices who formed the dissent in Apprendi and Blakely, thereby
125
authored.
creating a second majority opinion, which Justice Breyer

115. Solicitor General's Brief, 2004 WL 1967056 (Sept. 1, 2004); United States v.
Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) (Nos. 04-104, 04-105).
116. Booker/Fanfan, 125 S.Ct. at 738.
117. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
118. 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004).
119. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468; Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2534.
120. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468; Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2534.
121. 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).
122. Id. at 748-56.
123. Id. at 757-69.
124. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468; Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2534; Booker/Fanfan, 125 S.Ct.
at 745-46.
125. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468; Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2534; BookerIFanfan,125 S.Ct.
at 745-46.
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The Booker/FanfanBackground

In Booker the Government's certiorari petition challenged the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals holding that, although the federal sentencing
guidelines were unconstitutional in light of Blakely, the guidelines could
be applied without violating the constitution if no fact-based enhancement was involved. 2 ' A federal jury convicted defendant in Booker of
possessing with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine
127
based on evidence that he had 92.5 grams of crack in a duffel bag.
The range of imprisonment prescribed for that drug type and quantity
was 10 years to life under the United States Code'28 and 210 to 262
At sentencing,
months under the federal sentencing guidelines. 12
however, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant's relevant conduct included an additional 566 grams of crack
and that defendant obstructed justice. These findings enhanced the
guideline range of imprisonment to between 30 years and life; defendant
was sentenced to a 30-year term of imprisonment. 3 ' The Seventh
Circuit reversed, concluding that the sentence violated the Sixth
Amendment and remanded the case to the district court to either
sentence defendant "within the sentencing range supported by the jury's
findings or to hold a separate sentencing hearing before a jury."' 3'
In Fanfan the Government did not wait for the First Circuit Court of
Appeals to rule before seeking a ruling by the Supreme Court. The
federal jury in that case returned a special verdict stating that
defendant was guilty of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute 500 or more grams of cocaine. At sentencing the district
court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant's
relevant conduct included an additional 2.5 grams of cocaine powder and
261.6 grams of crack, and that defendant had an aggravating role in the
offense. These findings would have enhanced the guideline range of
imprisonment from the five to six years authorized by the jury verdict
to fifteen to sixteen years. However, relying on Blakely, as well as parts
of the Solicitor General's brief in that case, the district court concluded
that application of those drug types, drug quantity, and role enhancements, which were not based on the verdict, would violate defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Therefore, the district court

126. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 510 (7th Cir. 2004).
127. Booker/Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. at 746 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000)).
128. See U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2000).
129. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1.1(c)(4), 4A1.1 (2003).
130. Booker/Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. at 746.
131. Id. at 747 (citing United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004)).
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sentenced defendant within the guideline range authorized by the
verdict (between five and six years). After the Government's motion to
correct the sentence was denied, the Government appealed. Two days
after the appeal was docketed in the First Circuit, the Government filed
the certiorari petition in the Supreme Court.'3 2 The Supreme Court
granted the Government's certiorari petitions, consolidated and
expedited the cases, and proceeded to throw the federal criminal justice
system into a state of astonishment.'
B. The First Majority Opinion in Booker /Fanfan-The
ConstitutionalHolding
Contrary to the position taken by the Eleventh Circuit over the last
few years, the first majority opinion in Booker/Fanfan held that the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, as construed in Apprendi and
This holding
Blakely, applies to the federal sentencing guidelines.'
was based on two key factors. First, the Supreme Court explained that,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), 13 5 the federal sentencing guidelines
are mandatory.'36 As such, they create a "statutory maximum" for
purposes of Apprendi.13 v Second, under the guidelines, a judge finds
the facts necessary to support a sentence exceeding the authorized
138
maximum by facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict.
However, to comply with the Sixth Amendment, such facts must be
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.'39 In light of these factors, the Supreme Court held that the
federal sentencing guidelines, as mandated by the Sentencing Reform
Hence, the SuAct of 1984140 (the "Act"), are unconstitutional.'
sentencing
preme Court ruled in Booker/Fanfan that the federal
142
guidelines and the Act, as written, are unconstitutional.
In so ruling, the Supreme Court rejected three arguments posited by
the Government in support of its position that Blakely should not be

132. Id.
133. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 11 (2004).
134. Booker/Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. at 750-56.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. 2004).
136. Booker/Fanfan, 125 S.Ct. at 750 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). See also Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 391 (1989); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42 (1993).
137. Booker/Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. at 746-47.
138. Id. at 750-56.
139. Id.
140. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1984).
141. Booker/Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. at 750-56.
142. Id. at 775.
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extended to the federal sentencing guidelines. 4 3 First, the Government
argued that Blakely was distinguishable because a commission
promulgated the federal sentencing guidelines, while the legislature
promulgated the Washington state guidelines in Blakely. 14"
The
Supreme Court determined this distinction lacked in "constitutional
significance" given that "[r]egardless of whether the legal basis of the
accusation is in a statute or in guidelines promulgated by an independent commission, the principles behind the jury trial right are equally
applicable." 45
Second, the Government argued that the application of Blakely to the
federal sentencing guidelines was inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent, including United States v. Dunnigan,14 Witte v. United
States, 47 United States v. Watts, 148 and Edwards v. United
States.'
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court rejected various
challenges to the federal sentencing guidelines.
In Dunniganthe Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment right
to testify on one's own behalf is not violated when an obstruction of
justice guideline enhancement is imposed based on a judge's finding that
the defendant committed perjury at trial. 5 ' According to the first
majority in BookerlFanfan,there was no assertion in Dunniganthat the
obstruction of justice guideline "enhancement was invalid because it
resulted in a more severe sentence than the jury verdict had authorized."' 5' In ruling that Dunnigan is consistent with Booker/Fanfan,
the Supreme Court explained that a sentence that relied on an
obstruction ofjustice enhancement would be invalid under Blakely "if the
resulting sentence was outside the range authorized by the jury
verdict."' 52 The Court went on to explain, however, that "there are
many situations in which the district judge might find that the
enhancement is warranted, yet still sentence the defendant within the
range authorized by the jury .... Thus, while the reach of Dunnigan
may be limited, we need not overrule it."'53

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 752-55.
Id. at 752-53.
Id. at 753.
507 U.S. 87 (1993).
515 U.S. 389, 406 (1995).
519 U.S. 148 (1997).
523 U.S. 511 (1998).
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 99.
Booker/Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. at 753.
Id.
Id.
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Witte, according to the Court in Booker/Fanfan, is also consistent with
the ruling in Booker/Fanfan because in Witte there was no "contention
that the sentencing enhancement had exceeded the sentence authorized
by the jury verdict in violation of the Sixth Amendment." 54 In Witte
the Court rejected a double jeopardy challenge to the guidelines where
defendant was prosecuted for "conduct that had provided the basis for
an enhancement of the defendant's sentence in a prior case." 5 The
Booker/Fanfan Court explained that in Witte, the Court concluded that
"consideration of information about the defendant's character and
conduct at sentencing does not result in 'punishment' for any offense
other than the one of which the defendant was convicted."' 56 Instead,
consideration of such information only punished the defendant "for the
fact that the present offense was carried out in a manner that warrants
increased punishment ....
Likewise, Watts is consistent with Booker/Fanfanbecause there was
no assertion in Watts that "the sentencing enhancement had exceeded
the sentence authorized by the jury verdict in violation of the Sixth
Amendment.",5 Rather, the Court explained: "In Watts, relying on
Witte, we held that the Double Jeopardy Clause permitted a court to
consider acquitted conduct in sentencing a defendant under the
Guidelines." 5 9
Edwards is of particular interest because the Eleventh Circuit relied
on it in its initial decision in United States v. Reese160 to rule that

Blakely did not apply to the federal sentencing guidelines.''
154.

In

Id. at 754.

155. Id. at 753 (citing Witte, 515 U.S. at 389).
156.

Id. at 753-54 (citing Watts, 519 U.S. at 155 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Witte, 515

U.S. at 401, 403, 415)).
157.

Id.

158. Id. at 754.
159. Id.
160. 382 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2004).
161. Edwards, 523 U.S. at 513-14. See Reese, 382 F.3d at 1308 (holding Blakely did not
apply to the federal sentencing guidelines), vacated and remanded to 125 S. Ct. 1089
(2005), vacated by 397 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005).

The Eleventh Circuit's initial decision in Reese was vacated by the Supreme Court and
remanded for further consideration in light of Booker/Fanfan. See Reese, 125 S. Ct. at
1089. On remand the Eleventh Circuit vacated its initial decision and remanded the case
to the district court for resentencing in light of BookerlFanfan. Reese, 397 F.3d at 1337.
In that per curiam opinion, the Eleventh Circuit did not mention Edwards. Id.
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit relied on this interpretation of Edwards in UnitedStates
v. Duncan, wherein the Court determined the alleged Blakely violation was not so obvious
as to constitute plain error. See United States v. Duncan, 381 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2004).
Like Reese, Duncan was vacated by the Supreme Court and remanded for further
consideration in light of Booker/Fanfan. See Duncan v. United States, No. 03-15315, 2005
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Edwards the Supreme Court held that the federal sentencing guidelines
require the sentencing judge to determine the amount and type of drugs
involved in a drug conspiracy, and that the jury's beliefs about the
conspiracy were irrelevant. 6 2 Although the Supreme Court opinion in
Edwards did not mention the Sixth Amendment, the Eleventh Circuit
in Reese relied on the petitioner's brief in the Supreme Court in
Edwards, which contained a Sixth Amendment argument, to assert that
the Supreme Court in Edwards rejected a Sixth Amendment attack on
the federal sentencing guidelines.'6
In Booker/Fanfan the Supreme Court stated that Edwards did not
contraindicate the application of the Sixth Amendment to the federal
The Court in Booker/Fanfan explained that
sentencing guidelines."
in Edwards, the Court "recognized that the defendants' statutory and
constitutional claims might have had merit if it had been possible to
argue that their crack-related activities were not part of the same
conspiracy as their cocaine activities."'65 However, defendants "failed
to make that argument, and, based on our review of the record which
cocaine
showed 'a series of interrelated drug transactions involving both
166
and crack,' we concluded that no such claim could succeed."
Thus, the Court rejected the Government's stare decisis argument
because this Supreme Court precedent was consistent with the decision
6'
The Court then turned to the Government's
in Booker/Fanfan.1
third argument, namely, that if the guideline factors were required to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, those factors would become elements
of the crime, thereby granting the Sentencing Commission "the
inherently legislative power to define criminal elements" in violation of
the Separation of Powers doctrine.'6 8 The Court explained that "the
Commission's authority to identify the facts relevant to sentencing
decisions and to determine the impact of such facts on federal sentences
is precisely the same whether one labels such facts 'sentencing factors'
or 'elements' of crimes."'6 9 The Court noted that its decision in

WL 428414 (11th Cir. Feb. 24, 2005). Upon remand the Eleventh Circuit held that
defendant failed to meet the plain error standard of review because he had not shown a
violation of his substantial rights under the third prong of the plain error test. Id. at *1.
162. Edwards, 523 U.S. at 514.
163. Reese, 382 F.3d at 1311 (citing Edwards, 523 U.S. at 513-14).
164. BookerlFanfan, 125 S. Ct. at 754.
165. Id. (citing Edwards, 523 U.S. at 515).
166. Id.

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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Mistretta v. United States, 7 ° "upholding the validity of the delegation
of that authority," was not affected by its ruling in Booker/Fanfan, the
characterization of such facts, or the procedure used to find those
facts. 171
Having thus rejected each of the Government's three arguments
against applying the holding in Blakely to the federal sentencing
guidelines, the first majority in Booker/Fanfanreaffirmed its holding in
Apprendi that "[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is
necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by
the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt."'72 The question that remained was "whether or to what extent,
'as a matter of severability analysis,' the Guidelines 'as a whole' are
'inapplicable ... such that the sentencing court must exercise its
maximum and minimum
discretion to sentence the defendant within 'the
1 73
set by statute for the offense of conviction. '
C. The Second Majority Opinion in Booker /Fanfan-The Remedial
Holding
The second majority opinion, formed when Justice Ginsburgjoined the
Justices who dissented in Apprendi and Blakely, answered the remedial
question in a novel manner. 174 The remedial question was not proposed by any party or amicus curiae in Booker/Fanfan,nor was it relied
upon by any federal court that had previously addressed the application
of Blakely to the federal sentencing guidelines.'75 The second majority
reached the answer to the remedial question based on 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)(1), 176 the provision of the Sentencing Reform Act that made
the federal sentencing guidelines mandatory, and which the Court

170. 488 U.S. 361, 391 (1989).
171. Booker/Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. at 754-55 (stating that "[w]e have ... always
recognized the fact that the Commission is an independent agency that exercises
policy-making authority delegated to it by Congress.").
172. Id. at 756.
173. Id. (quoting United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), petition for cert.
filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 4056 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2005) (No. 04-104)).
174. Id. at 756-57.
175. Id. at 777-78 (Stevens, Souter & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) ("The novelty of this
remedial maneuver perhaps explains why no party or amicus curiae to this litigation has
requested the remedy the Court now orders. In addition, none of the federal courts that
have addressed Blakely's application to the Guidelines has concluded that striking down
§ 3553(b)(1) is a proper solution.").
176. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. 2004).
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77
concluded was "incompatible with today's constitutional holding."
Based on that determination, the Court concluded that § 3553(b)(1), as
well as § 3742(e),7 8 which set forth the standards of review for the
appeal of guideline sentences and was dependant on the mandatory
nature of the guidelines, had to be severed and excised from the
of the Act, thus making the guidelines "effectively advisoremainder
79
1

ry."

In choosing this remedy, the second majority in Booker/Fanfan
rejected the remedy the dissent proposed-"maintaining the Act as
written with jury factfinding added ..,,18o

The Court reasoned that

"Congress would likely have preferred the total invalidation of the Act
to an Act with the Court's Sixth Amendment requirement engrafted onto
it," and "Congress would likely have preferred the excision of some of the
Act, namely the Act's mandatory language, to the invalidation of the
entire Act."18 Thus, under the remedy applied by the second majority
in Booker/Fanfan, instead of being the defining factor in sentencing
criminal defendants, the federal sentencing guidelines are now just one
8 2 Factors to be
of the factors that must be considered at sentencing."
considered include the need for just punishment, deterrence, protection
of the public, and rehabilitation of the defendant. 8 '

177. Booker/Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. at 756 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. 2004)).
178. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1), 3742(e) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
179. Booker/Fanfan,125 S.Ct. at 756-57 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1), 3742(e) (2000
& Supp. 2004)).
180. Id. at 758.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 756. Without the mandatory provision, the remainder of the Act still
requires consideration of the sentencing range and policy statements set forth in the
guidelines, as well as "the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need
to provide restitution to victims. . . ." Id. at 764-65 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7)
(2000 & Supp. 2004)).
183. Id. at 765 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2004)). Section 3553(a)
requires imposition of"a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with
the purposes" contained in § 3553(a)(2), which provides that in fashioning the sentence, the
court consider:
(2) the need for the sentence imposed(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. ...
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
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The second majority noted that its remedial decision was not the "last
'
Rather, the Court stated, "[tihe ball now lies in Congress'
word."184
court. The National Legislature is equipped to devise and install,
long-term, the sentencing system, compatible with the Constitution, that
Congress judges best for the federal system of justice."' 85
D.

Sentencing Appeals after Booker/Fanfan

The second majority further stated that despite the fact that § 3742(e)
contained the standards of review for sentencing appeals, its excision
would not pose a critical problem for the handling of appeals because "a
statute that does not explicitly set forth a standard of review may
nonetheless do so implicitly."'86 The Court believed that the appropri8 7
ate standard of review in this instance was that of reasonableness.
Additionally, the Court stated that both of its holdings, constitutional
and remedial, must be applied "to all cases on direct review."188
However, the Court explained:
That fact does not mean that we believe that every sentence gives rise
to a Sixth Amendment violation. Nor do we believe that every appeal
will lead to a new sentencing hearing. That is because we expect
reviewing courts to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, determining,
for example, whether the issue was raised below and whether it fails
the "plain-error" test. It is also because, in cases not involving a Sixth
Amendment violation, whether resentencing is warranted or whether
it will instead be sufficient to review a sentence for reasonableness may
depend upon application of the harmless-error doctrine."'
The Dispositions of Booker and Fanfan
The Supreme Court remanded both Booker and Fanfan without
engaging in any after-the-fact analysis of whether the sentences were

E.

184. BookerlFanfan, 125 S. Ct. at 768.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 765 (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 99 (1996); Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 403-05 (1990); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558-60
(1988)).
187. Id. at 765-66.
188. Id. at 769 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (stating in part
that "anew rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to
all cases ...pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which
the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past"); Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde,
514 U.S. 749, 752 (1995) (civil case); Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97
(1993) (civil case)).
189. Id.
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"reasonable." 9 ' In Booker the Court affirmed the judgment of the
Seventh Circuit, which "held Blakely applicable to the Guidelines,
concluded that Booker's sentence violated the Sixth Amendment, vacated
191
the judgment of the District Court, and remanded for resentencing."
On remand, the Supreme Court instructed the district court to "impose
a sentence in accordance with today's opinions, and, if the sentence
comes before the Court of Appeals for review, the Court of Appeals
should apply the review standards set forth in this opinion."' 92
In Fanfan there was no actual Sixth Amendment violation because the
district court held that Blakely applied to the federal sentencing
guidelines and "imposed a sentence that was authorized by the jury's
verdict-a sentence lower than the sentence authorized by the Guidelines as written. " 19 3 Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court noted that
"the Government (and the defendant should he so choose) may seek
resentencing under the system set forth in today's opinions."'94 Thus,
the Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded "the case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion." 95
VII.

POST-BOOKER/FANFAN DEVELOPMENTS

Within approximately a month of deciding Booker/Fanfan,'9 6 the
Supreme Court issued memorandum opinions in more than 400 cases,
granting certiorari, vacating the decision below, and remanding for
further consideration in light of Booker/Fanfan.9 A number of these
cases are from the Eleventh Circuit, some of which are discussed
below19 and some of which were cases where the Blakely v. Washing-

190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Grimes, No. 03-11921 (11th Cir. July 22, 2004), reh'g
denied, (11th Cir. Sept. 2, 2004), vacated and remanded to 125 S. Ct. 1085 (2005) (mem.);
United States v. Kemp, No. 03-15332 (11th Cir. June 25, 2004) (order dismissing appeal),
vacated and remanded to 125 S. Ct. 1097 (2005) (mem.). See also Smith v. United States,
125 S. Ct. 1612 (2005) (mem.); Mitchell v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1617 (2005) (mem.);
Pipkins v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1617 (2005) (mem.); Levy v. United States, 125 S. Ct.
1619 (2005) (mem.); Senn v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1397 (2005) (mem.); Smith v. United
States, 125 S. Ct. 1401 (2005) (mem.); Mandile v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1405 (2005)
(mem.); Walker v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1407 (2005) (mem.); Marshek v. United States,
125 S. Ct. 1409 (2005) (mem.); Ross v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1411 (2005) (mem.).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 382 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated and
remanded to 125 S. Ct. 1089 (2005), vacated by 397 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005).
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ton "' and Booker!Fanfan issue was raised for the first time in the
certiorari petition. °0
The Eleventh Circuit's response to Booker/Fanfan between January
12 and March 12, 2005, can be categorized into five main types of cases.
In particular, during this two month period the Eleventh Circuit issued
published decisions in cases where the Booker/Fanfan issue was (1)
objected to and preserved in the district court; (2) not objected to or
preserved in the district court, and thus subject to plain error review on
appeal; (3) not raised in the initial appellate brief; (4) reviewed in the
context of an appeal waiver provision contained in a plea agreement; and
(5) raised in collateral (post-conviction) proceedings.
A. Eleventh Circuit Cases Where the Booker/Fanfan Issue Was
Preserved in the DistrictCourt
The January 27, 2005 decision in United States v. Reese2"' is the
only Eleventh Circuit case decided in the two months following the Booker/Fanfan decision where the court dealt with a Booker/Fanfan issue
that had been properly preserved in the district court and timely raised
in the Eleventh Circuit. 202 However, the Eleventh Circuit did not
expound upon Booker/Fanfanin that decision.
In its initial decision in Reese, the Eleventh Circuit held that Blakely
did not apply to the federal sentencing guidelines.0 3 On January 25,
the Supreme Court issued a memorandum opinion, granting certiorari,
vacating the initial Eleventh Circuit decision, and remanding the case
to the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration in light of Booker/Fanfan.20 4 On remand, the Eleventh Circuit issued a short, per
curiam opinion, which vacated the district court's judgment concerning
the sentence and remanded the case to "the district court for resentencing consistent with the Supreme Court opinions in Booker."' °5

199. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Lefebvre, No. 03-15018 (11th Cir. Apr. 21,2004), vacated
and remanded by 125 S. Ct. 1003 (2005) (mem.).
201. 382 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2004).
202. Id. at 1308, 1312 (holding Blakely does not apply to the federal sentencing guidelines), vacatedand remanded to 125 S. Ct. 1089 (2005), vacated by 397 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir.
Jan. 27, 2005).
203. Reese, 382 F.3d at 1310, 1312.
204. Reese, 125 S. Ct. at 1089.
205. Reese, 397 F.3d at 1338.
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B. Eleventh Circuit Cases Where the BookerlFanfan Issue Was NOT
Preserved in the District Court-PlainError Cases
In contrast to the single Eleventh Circuit case dealing with a
Booker/Fanfan issue that had been preserved in the district court, the
Eleventh Circuit rendered four decisions in February 2005 dealing with
Booker/Fanfan claims that had not been raised in the district court, and
each case was reviewed for plain error.2"6 Under the plain error test,
an alleged error, which was not objected to in the district court, may be
raised for the first time on appeal when the party establishes: (1) that
there is error; (2) that the error is plain or obvious; (3) that the error
affects the party's substantial rights; and (4) that "the error seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 9)2O7
In the first Eleventh Circuit case applying the plain error test after
Booker/Fanfan, United States v. Rodriguez,0 5 the court determined
that defendant satisfied the first prong of the test.2 9 Specifically, the
court in Rodriguez stated that a Booker /Fanfan error occurred when, in
applying the guidelines as mandatory, the district court enhanced
defendant's sentence beyond the sentence authorized by the verdict or
defendant's admissions, based on its findings regarding drug quantity.210 The court explained that the error was not just that extraverdict enhancements had been applied because both majority opinions
in Booker/Fanfan indicated such enhancements would not be unconstitutional if the guidelines had not been mandatory. 211 Rather, the court
in Rodriguez determined that "[t]he constitutional error is the use of
extra-verdict enhancements to reach a guidelines result that is binding
on the sentencing judge; the error is the mandatory nature
of the
212
guidelines once the guidelines range has been determined."
Having discovered such an error in Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit
further determined that the error was "plain" based on the law in

206. See United States v. Curtis, 400 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir.
2005); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005).
207. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1298 (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631
(2002) (quotations and internal marks omitted)).
208. 398 F.3d 1291 (2005).
209. Id. at 1298.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing Booker/Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. at 750, 764-65).
212. Id. at 1301.
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existence at the time of appeal, that is, the decision in Book2 13
The third prong of the plain error test, however, proved
erIFanfan.
more troublesome.
The Eleventh Circuit panel in Rodriguez explained that the third
prong of the plain error test-the violation of substantial
rights-depended on the error.2 14 Because the court determined that
the error was not just the use of extra-verdict enhancements, but the use
of such enhancements to impose a mandatory guideline sentence, the
court opined that to show prejudice under the third prong the defendant
must prove that "there is a reasonable probability of a different result
if the guidelines had been applied in an advisory instead of binding
fashion."215 In meeting this burden, the court in Rodriguez explained
that defendant may not speculate on how the district court may have
216
sentenced him if it had known that the guidelines were advisory.
For example, "if the effect of the error is uncertain so that we do not
know which, if either, side it helped the defendant loses. 2 7 Deciding
that the record in Rodriguez provided "no reason to believe any result is
more likely than the other," the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
218
defendant could not establish the third prong of the plain error test.
In so ruling, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the reasoning of the other
circuit courts of appeals that had applied the third prong of the plain
error test in post-Booker/Fanfan cases.219 Specifically, the Eleventh
Circuit split from the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits, which had
concluded defendants satisfied the prejudice requirement, thereby
warranting remand based on the application of extra-verdict enhancements, without determining whether the district court would have
imposed the same sentence under advisory guidelines.22 °

213. Id. at 1299 (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997)) (stating
that "where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the
time of appeal-it is enough that the error be 'plain' at the time of appellate consideration.").
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1300-01.
216. Id. at 1300.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1301.
219. Id. at 1301-02 (citing United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005); United
States v. Hughes, 396 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369 (6th
Cir. 2005)).
220. Hughes, 396 F.3d at 379 (stating that prejudice was established by the fact that
the Sixth Amendment violation resulted in a sentence greater than the maximum guideline
range authorized by the jury verdict); Oliver, 397 F.3d at 378 (vacating and remanding for
resentencing because the district court committed plain error by increasing defendant's
sentence under federal sentencing guidelines in violation of Sixth Amendment, as
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Because the Eleventh Circuit determined that defendant in Rodriguez
had not satisfied the third prong of the plain error test, the court did not
address the fourth prong. The Fourth Circuit, however, did address the
fourth prong and held that "to leave standing this sentence imposed
under the mandatory guideline regime, we have no doubt, is to place in
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedjeopardy
,2 21
ings.
United States v. Duncan222 was the next case the Eleventh Circuit
reviewed under the plain error test. The opinion in Duncan was
rendered on rehearing; it vacated and superseded the original opinion
therein, which was rendered after Blakely, but before BookerlFanfan.223 Like Rodriguez, the court in Duncan concluded that
error occurred and that the error was plain.224 However, unlike
Rodriguez and despite the special jury verdict finding of powder cocaine
(not cocaine base), the district court enhanced defendant's mandatory
guideline sentence based on its extra-verdict finding, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that some of the cocaine powder involved in the offense
had been converted into cocaine base.225
The Court in Duncan determined that the district court did not err by
relying on acquitted conduct because Booker/Fanfan did not overrule
binding precedent that allowed the sentencing court to rely on relevant
conduct of which defendant was acquitted and which was established by
a preponderance of the evidence.226 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit
stated that the error in Duncan, like the error in Rodriguez, was the
district court's application of the sentencing guidelines "as if they were
mandatory .... ,,2 7 Because defendant could not meet the burden that
there was "a reasonable probability of a different result if the guidelines
had been applied in an advisory instead of binding fashion," defendant
failed to meet his burden of persuasion concerning the third prong of the

construed in Booker); United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 120 (remanding to give the
district court the opportunity to consider whether to resentence defendant based on plain
error in applying the federal sentencing guidelines).
221. Hughes, 396 F.3d at 381 (internal quotations omitted).
222. 400 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2005).
223. See United States v. Duncan, 381 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2004), vacatedon rehearing,
No. 03-15315, 2005 WL 428414 (11th Cir. Feb. 24, 2005).
224. Duncan, 400 F.3d at 1301.
225. Id. at 1301, 1303.
226. Id. at 1304-05 (citing Booker/Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. at 750; United States v. Watts,
519 U.S. 148, 153 (1997); United States v. Barakat, 130 F.3d 1448, 1452 (11th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Frazier, 89 F.3d 1501, 1506 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Averi, 922
F.2d 765, 766 (11th Cir. 1991)).
227. Id. at 1304.
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plain error test. 228 In so ruling, the Eleventh Circuit again rejected
the other circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, which had ruled
differently regarding the third prong.2 29
Additionally, the court in Duncan rejected defendant's "creative"
argument that the retroactive application of Justice Breyer's remedial
holding in Booker/Fanfan "would increase the sentence authorized by
the jury's verdict to a maximum of life, and therefore would operate, in
light of his life sentence, as an ex post facto law in violation of his due
process rights." 2 0 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that at the time
defendant committed the offense, the United States Code and the
guidelines, which allowed for a life sentence based on judicial fact
31
finding, provided defendant with notice of a potential life sentence.
The court based this conclusion, in part, on case law in effect at the time
of the offense that held Apprendi did not apply to the guidelines, and
that the statutory maximum was specified in the United States
Code.232
Like Duncan, the February 28, 2005 decision in United States v.
Curtis233 was issued on rehearing and turned on the third prong of the
plain error test. 234 The initial decision in Curtis rejected defendant's
Blakely issue on two grounds. As discussed further below, the panel
ruled that defendant could not raise a Blakely issue in a supplemental
brief, even though Blakely was decided after the initial briefing.235
Alternatively, the court ruled in footnote two that defendant could not
satisfy the plain error test.236

228. Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1300).
229. Id. at 1305 (citing United States v. Hughes, 396 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2005) (vacating
and remanding defendant's pre-BookerlFanfansentence as plainly erroneous because the
district court did not have an opportunity to impose a sentence under an advisory guideline
system); United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding there was plain
error in the enhancement of defendant's guideline sentence based upon the court's factual
findings); United States v. Ameline, 400 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2005) (reviewing Booker/Fanfan
issue sua sponte and holding, on rehearing, that defendant's sentence violated Booker/Fan/anbecause the guideline enhancements were applied based on facts found by the
court, but not admitted by defendant when he pled guilty).
230. Duncan, 400 F.3d at 1307.
231. Id. at 1307-08.
232. Id. at 1308 (citing United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001)
(en banc), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 942 (2002)).
233. 400 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2005).
234. Id. at 1336.
235. United States v. Curtis, 380 F.3d 1308, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2004).
236. Id. at 1311 n.2.
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On rehearing, the court in Curtis only modified its prior opinion by
substituting a new footnote two.237 In that case the Eleventh Circuit
relied on Rodriguez in concluding that defendant could not establish a
violation of his substantial rights under the third prong of the plain
error test. 23 8 "Indeed, we note that the sentencing judge sentenced
Curtis to the maximum term of imprisonment permitted by the relevant
Guideline, an action which is inconsistent with any suggestion that the
sentencing judge might have imposed a23lesser
sentence if the judge had
9
realized the Guidelines were advisory."
Of the four cases applying the plain error standard of review, United
States v. Shelton240 is the only case in which the court held that
defendant had met his burden of establishing all four prongs of the plain
error test.241 Defendant in that case posited two errors in his sentence,
both of which the Eleventh Circuit rejected.242
First, defendant
claimed that the district court erroneously enhanced his sentence based
on his prior convictions. 243 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed because
binding precedent did not require prior convictions to be pleaded in the
indictment or proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be the basis for a
sentence enhancement.2 "
Second, defendant argued that the district court erred in finding drug
quantity. 245 In rejecting that argument, the Eleventh Circuit noted
that the indictment, which stated the offense involved "at least five (5)
grams of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of
cocaine base, commonly known as crack cocaine," would have authorized
a base offense level of twenty-six. 246 The district court utilized base
offense level thirty, due to its finding regarding relevant conduct that
included more drugs than were specified in the indictment.247 Notwithstanding, the Eleventh Circuit ruled this was not Booker/Fanfan

237. Curtis,400 F.3d at 1335-36.
238. Id. (citing Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1299).
239. Id. at 1336.
240. 400 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2005).
241. Id. at 1333.
242. Id. at 1329.
243. Id.
244. Id. (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)). See also id.
(quoting Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756 (opinion of Stevens, J.) ("reaffirming that '[a]ny fact
(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt')).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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error because defendant admitted the additional drugs were involved in
the offense.24
Despite concluding there was no Sixth Amendment violation in
Shelton, the Eleventh Circuit relied on Rodriguez in determining that:
(1) there was error under Booker/Fanfan because the district court
sentenced defendant under mandatory guidelines; and (2) that the error
249
was plain because Booker/Fanfan was decided during this appeal.
The Eleventh Circuit then determined that defendant established
prejudice under the third prong of the plain error test because, in
sentencing defendant to the lowest sentence authorized by the mandatory guidelines, the district court "expressed several times its view that
the sentence required by the Guidelines was too severe ....
Further, defendant established the fourth prong given the district court's
"express desire to impose a sentence lesser than the low end of the
Guidelines range of 130 months' imprisonment," which the district court
2
would have discretion to do under Booker/Fanfan. 11 "Under these
circumstances, defendant Shelton has carried his burden to establish the
fourth prong and has shown that the plain error that affected his
substantial rights also seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public
252
Hence,
reputation of the judicial proceedings in his particular case."
resentencing
for
remanded
was
case
the
his sentence was vacated and
253
consistent with Booker/Fanfan.
C. Eleventh Circuit Cases Where the Booker/Fanfan Issue Was NOT
Raised in the Initial Appellate Brief
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit issued decisions in four cases wherein
the court refused to consider the Booker/Fanfanissue because it was not
raised in the initial brief.254 These four cases fall within two main

248. Id. at 1330.
249. Id. at 1331 (citing Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1298).
250. Id. at 1332.
251. Id. at 1333-34.
252. Id. at 1334.
253. Id.
254. See United States v. Dockery, No. 03-16388, 2005 WL 487735 (11th Cir. Mar. 3,
2005) (reinstating its initial opinion, after the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for
reconsideration in light of Booker; initial opinion holding that defendant had abandoned
Booker/Fanfan issue by not previously raising it in his initial appellate brief); United
States v. Curtis, 400 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2005) (reaffirming, on panel rehearing, its initial
ruling that the Booker/Fanfan issue, which was not raised in the initial brief, could not
be raised for the first time in a supplemental brief); United States v. Lebovitz, No.
04-10185, 2005 WL 503259 n.1 (11th Cir. Mar. 4, 2005) (stating that "[n]either party has
raised at any time any issue concerning United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
Accordingly, we say nothing else about that decision."); United States v. Grant, 397 F.3d
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In one group are the two cases-United States v.Lebovit

255

and United States v. Grant 256-wherein neither party raised any issue
related to Booker/Fanfan at any time in the district court or on appeal.
Thus, in both cases, rather than addressing any Booker/Fanfan issue
sua sponte, the Eleventh Circuit simply noted the parties' failure
to ever
257
raise such an issue and said nothing further on the matter.
In the second group-United States v. Dockery2 5 and United States
v. Curtis 259-defendants tried to raise the Booker/Fanfan issue, but
the Eleventh Circuit ruled they were procedurally barred from doing so
because they had not raised it in their initial appellate briefs. so
In Dockery the Supreme Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit decision
and remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit for reconsideration in
light of Booker/Fanfan.26 ' On remand, the Eleventh Circuit held that
defendant had abandoned the Booker/Fanfan issue by failing to raise
any constitutional issue in his initial brief.2 2 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit reinstated the opinion that the Supreme Court had vacated.2 6'

1330, 1331 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that "Grant has not contended either in district
court or this court that the Apprendi IBlakely/Booker line of decisions affect the validity
of his sentence").
255. 2005 WL 503259 at *8 n.1.
256. 397 F.3d at 1330.
257. Lebovitz, 2005 WL 503259 at *8 n.1; Grant, 397 F.3d at 1331 n.2. But see United
States v. Ameline, 400 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2005) (reviewing Booker/Fanfanissue sua sponte
and holding, on rehearing, that defendant's sentence violated Booker/Fanfanbecause the
guideline enhancements were applied based on facts found by the court, but not admitted
by defendant when he pleaded guilty).
258. No. 03-16388, 2005 WL 487735 (11th Cir. Mar. 3, 2005).
259. 400 F.3d 1334 (2005).
260. Curtis, 400 F.3d at 1335; Dockery, 2005 WL 487735 at *1.
261. See Dockery v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1101 (2005).
262. Dockery, 2005 WL 487735 at *1.
263. Id. In so ruling, the Eleventh Circuit relied on its decision in United States v.
Ardley, 273 F.3d 991 (11th Cir. 2001). Ardley was remanded for further consideration in
light of Apprendi. Id. at 995. In Ardley the Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for
rehearing en banc in a case in which the panel had held, in United States v. Ardley, 242
F.3d 989 (11th Cir. 2001), that, despite a remand from the Supreme Court for consideration
of an Apprendi claim raised for the first time in a petition for writ of certiorari, appellant
had "abandoned" the claim by failing to raise it in any of his appellate briefs. Ardley, 273
F.3d at 999; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The denial of rehearing en banc
contained significant dissenting and concurring opinions of several members of the en banc
Court. Among the issues discussed were whether the failure to raise an Apprendi claim,
prior to the decision in Apprendi could be ineffective assistance. Ardley, 273 F.3d at 993.
Four judges said no; two judges said maybe. Id. at 991, 1007. The dissent also claimed
that the Court's rigid adherence to the "abandonment" doctrine "perversely promote[d]
judicial activism" under the guise of judicial restraint. Id. at 1000 n.8.
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In Curtis the appeal had been briefed and orally argued prior to the
decision in Blakely but no sentencing issue had been raised, and no
Eleventh Circuit decision had issued. Shortly after Blakely was decided,
defendant moved for permission to file a supplemental brief addressing
his sentence in light of Blakely. 2" The Eleventh Circuit denied the
motion, stating that the rules of appellate procedure did not allow for
supplemental briefs in these circumstances.2 6' As discussed previousnot establish
ly, the court held, in the alternative, that defendant could
266
the second and fourth prongs of the plain error test.
A petition for rehearing en banc was filed, and after Booker/Fanfan,
the court ordered the parties to file letter briefs addressing the effect of
Booker and Fanfan. Thereafter, the panel treated the petition for
rehearing as a petition for rehearing by the panel and granted it, but
only to the extent of modifying footnote two, which addressed the plain
error issue.26 7 The panel did not accept defendant's request to revisit
the supplemental briefing issue."
D. Eleventh Circuit Cases Where the Booker/Fanfan Issue was
Addressed in Light of an Appeal Waiver Provision in a Plea Agreement
In three cases the Eleventh Circuit relied on the appeal waiver
language in plea agreements to preclude consideration of the Booker/Fanfan challenge to defendants' sentence.269 Although the appeal
waiver provision in each plea agreement contained exceptions, the
Eleventh Circuit ruled that none of the exceptions applied, thereby
foreclosing appeals in each case. °
The first of these cases was United States v.Rubbo 1 The plea
agreement therein, which came out of the Southern District of Florida,
allowed for a sentencing appeal if "the sentence exceeds the maximum
permitted by statute."27 2 Defendant argued her sentence "exceeded the

264. Curtis, 380 F.3d at 1309-10.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1311 n.2.
267. Curtis, 400 F.3d at 1335.
268. Id. In ruling that supplemental briefing based on Booker/Fanfan was not
permitted by the appellate rules, the court "continue[d] a circuit split that finds this court
standing alone." United States v. Levy, 391 F.3d 1327, 1336-37 (11th Cir. 2004) (Tjoflat,
J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
269. See United States v. Frye, No. 03-16377, 2005 WL 564039 (11th Cir. Mar. 11,
2005); United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Rubbo, 396 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2005).
270. Id.
271. 396 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2005).
272. Id. at 1333 (emphasis omitted).
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'statutory maximum' as defined in Blakely," and thus, was excepted from
the court
the appeal waiver."' The Eleventh Circuit disagreed,27though
4
stated that defendant's position was "not outlandish."
The exceptions to defendant's appeal waiver in United States v.
Grinard-Henry,"' which arose in the Middle District of Florida,
allowed defendant to appeal a sentence above the statutory maximum
and "to appeal 'a sentence in violation of the law apart from the
sentencing guidelines."'27 6 As in Rubbo, the Eleventh Circuit determined these exceptions in Grinard-Henry were not broad enough to
encompass defendant's challenge to the sentence under Booker/Fanfan.27 7' Thus, the court denied defendant's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the appeal in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Booker/Fanfan 8
In United States v. Frye, 9 the exceptions to the appeal waiver from
Alabama allowed for an appeal if "(1) the sentence was imposed ,in
excess of the statutory maximum; (2) the sentence constitutes an upward
departure from the guideline range; or (3) he was deprived of effective
assistance of counsel." 280 The Eleventh Circuit ruled these exceptions
did not apply to a Booker/Fanfan issue. 28 ' Having concluded that
defendant's plea agreement was knowingly and voluntarily entered, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the appeal was barred.28 2
E. Eleventh Circuit Cases Where the Booker/FanfanIssue Was
Raised in a Post-ConvictionMotion
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit addressed Booker/Fanfan in the context
of collateral review in two cases-Varela v. United States28 3 and In re
Anderson. 2 "4 Although both cases involved motions for post-conviction
relief filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,288 the standard for applying
Booker/Fanfan was different in each case.286
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Id. at 1332-33.
Id. at 1333.
399 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1297.
Id.
No. 03-16377, 2005 WL 564039 (11th Cir. Mar. 11, 2005).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *5.
400 F.3d 864 (11th Cir. 2005).
396 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2005).
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
Varela, 400 F.3d at 867; Anderson, 396 F.3d at 1337, 1339.
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In Anderson, which was decided first, the § 2255 motion was
successive. s7 In order to file a second, or successive, § 2255 motion
based on a new constitutional rule, the Supreme Court first must hold
that the rule is retroactive. 28 8 The Eleventh Circuit denied defendant's
second § 2255 motion in Anderson regardless of whether the rule set
forth in Booker /Fanfan constituted a new rule of constitutional law and
because the Supreme Court had not so ruled with regard to the rule set
forth in Apprendi, Blakely, or Booker/Fanfan. 9
The § 2255 motion at issue in Varela was defendant's first such
motion. 2 0 Therefore, defendant in Varela asked the Eleventh Circuit
to retroactively apply Booker/Fanfan (and Blakely).291' The Eleventh
Circuit declined to do so, determining that Schriro v. Summerlin,292 "is
essentially dispositive. '2 93 In Schriro the Supreme Court held that
Ring v.Arizona,294 which applied Apprendi in the context of death
penalty sentencing, did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral
review. 291 Similarly, the court in29 Varela held Booker/Fanfan and
Blakely did not apply retroactively.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's definitive ruling in Booker/Fanfan that the Sixth Amendment, as construed in Apprendi and
Blakely, does apply to the federal sentencing guidelines leaves many
questions unanswered. The circuit courts have already split in their
reasoning and holdings regarding several aspects of the application of
Booker/Fanfan.It is not known whether the Supreme Court will rule on
these questions and resolve this circuit split as expeditiously as it did in
Booker/Fanfan,following Blakely, or whether the Court will wait years
to address these matters as it did following Apprendi. Either way, at this
point at least, the ramifications of Booker/Fanfan remain food for
fodder.
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